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CORPORATE DEADLOCKS
Revision of the North Carolina Statute's Corporate Deadlock Provisions
With the tremendous growth in recent years in the use of the corpo-
rate form of doing business and the proliferation of "incorporated part-
nerships," there has been a recognition of the need for state corporation
statutes to provide remedies other than dissolution for the deadlocked
corporation. In 1971 a package of revisions' to the North Carolina
deadlock provision that was prepared by the Business Corporation Act
Drafting Committee of the North Carolina General Statutes Commis-
sion to provide such alternatives was presented to the North Carolina
General Assembly, but no action was taken on the proposals. These
recommendations will again be presented to the 1973 General Assem-
bly.' This comment will evaluate these proposals and will discuss other
alternatives to the existing law that could be employed.
Corporate deadlock results when the shareholders of a corporation
are unable to elect directors as a result of a voting stalemate or when
the board of directors is unable to take effective management action for
the same reason.3 The traditional rule at common law was that a court
of equity did not have the power to dissolve a deadlocked corporation.
4
Corporations were viewed as creatures of the legislature, so that their
charters could not be taken away by the courts without statutory author-
ity.' As a result, practically all the important commercial and industrial
'Clifford, Survey of Recent Developments and Prospects for Change, in NORTH CAROLINA
BAR ASS'N, INSTITUTE ON BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1-23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Clifford].
The North Carolina corporate deadlock provision is N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-125(a)(l)-(2) (1965).
'Clifford 1-23.
3N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-125(a)(l)-(2) (1965) provide:
(a) The superior court shall have power to liquidate the assets and business of a
corporation in an action by a shareholder when it is established that:
(1) The directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs
and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, so that the business can
no longer be conducted to the advantage of all the shareholders; or
(2) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, otherwise than by virtue
of special provisions or arrangements designed to create veto power among the
shareholders, and for that reason have been unable at two consecutive annual
meetings to elect successors to directors whose terms had expired ....
16A W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8016.1 (rev. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
FLETCHER]. However, the principle that a court of equity was utterly without the power to dissolve
a corporation upon deadlock was not fully settled. Professor Hornstein, for example, suggests that
equity does have the inherent power to dissolve a corporation upon a deadlock, but that the
dissolution statutes were passed to eliminate "qualms as to whether action can be taken in the
absence of statute." 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 789 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as HORNSTEIN].
'Note, Deadlock and Dissolution in Close Corporations, 45 IOWA L. REV. 767, 768 (1960).
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states have enacted statutes specifically authorizing corporate dissolu-
tion in situations of deadlock in director or shareholder voting.' Under
the present North Carolina dissolution-upon-deadlock provision, sec-
tion 55-125 of the North Carolina General Statutes, a court can order
dissolution because of director deadlock if the suing shareholder can
establish the stronger equities7 and prove (1) that the directors are dead-
locked in the management of the corporate affairs, (2) that the share-
holders are unable to break the deadlock, and (3) that because of the
deadlock the business can no longer be conducted to the advantage of
all the shareholders.8 A court can order dissolution because of
shareholder deadlock if the suing shareholder can establish the stronger
equities' and prove (1) that the shareholders are deadlocked in voting
power, (2) that the reason for the deadlock is not related to special
arrangements designed to create veto power among the shareholders,
and (3) that because of the deadlock the shareholders have been unable
at two consecutive annual meetings to elect successors to directors
whose terms have expired. 0
Dissolution of the corporation has been the traditional statutory
response to the problem of deadlock. The North Carolina provision is
patterned after the Model Business Corporations Act," and both it and
the Model Act provide no alternative remedy for a deadlocked corpora-
tion.
THE NEED FOR REVISION OF THE DEADLOCK PROVISIONS
Apart from the fact that section 55-125 fails to provide a satisfac-
tory remedy for many types of corporate deadlock situations, there are
other problems that arise from the application of the statute. First, as
mentioned above,12 to get dissolution because of director deadlock a
petitioner must prove the stronger equities plus all the elements of
subsection (a)(1) of section 55-125. Each of these three elements requires
a factual determination that may often be very difficult to resolve.'3 For
62 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.29 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL].
IR. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 221, at 548 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as ROBINSON].
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(1) (1965), quoted note 3 supra.
'ROBINSON § 221, at 548.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(2) (1965), quoted note 3 supra.
"ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 97 (1953).
"See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
"ROBINSON § 221, at 548.
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instance, "mere friction and surface dissension" may not justify dissolu-
tion, while dissolution would be called for in the face of a "fundamental
and irreconcilable conflict amounting to a complete deadlock."' , The
difference between "mere friction and surface dissension" on the one
hand and "fundamental and irreconcilable conflict" on the other is
largely undefinable and may be quite difficult to discern. 15 Thus the
statute fails to provide a court with an easily implemented standard for
determining when a deadlock exists. Furthermore, the statute does not
say when a business is to be considered as no longer being "conducted
to the advantage of all the shareholders." This phrase may simply mean
that if the corporation is making any profit at all no shareholder has
the right to petition for dissolution because of deadlock. Alternatively,
it may have been intended to set up a looser standard and to permit
dissolution where, for example, dividends are not being paid at an opti-
mum level or where certain shareholders are receiving greater benefits
than others through exorbitant salaries.
Secondly, the North Carolina statute shares a problem with most
other states' dissolution-upon-deadlock statutes in that the power of the
court to grant dissolution is discretionary. The statute states that if the
petitioner establishes the elements required, the superior court "shall
have the power" to dissolve. But, like the statutes of most other states, 16
the North Carolina statute fails to specify circumstances requiring the
court to exercise its power. The courts of some states do say that when
the prerequisites of the statute are met, the deadlock compels dissolu-
tion.17 However, in construing a statute such as North Carolina's, which
is "permissive in its terms,"1" the court will consider the circumstances
of the case in addition to the requirements contained in the statute. For
example, if the facts indicate that dissolution of the corporation will be
followed by the establishment of a new business by some shareholders
to the exclusion of others, thus resulting in essentially an appropriation
of the corporation's goodwill, the court will be reluctant to grant disso-
lution even though the statutory requirements for dissolution have been
1Id.
15ld.
262 HORNSTEIN § 822.
"I P-H CORP. 1157 (1971); see In re Evening Journal Ass'n, 15 N.J. Super. 58, 83 A.2d 38
(1951), construing the precusor to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (1969); Strong v. Fromm Labora-
tories, 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389 (1956), construing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.771 (1957).
"ROBINSON § 221, at 548.
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met."9 In addition, the courts often look to the "public interest" and
require that the deadlock be injurious to that interest before granting
dissolution."0 Other factors often articulated are the needs of benefit to
the shareholders,2 and the need for a proper "balance" of the "conveni-
ences of both parties. '2 These additional factors used by the courts to
determine whether or not to exercise their discretion to grant dissolution
can be viewed as a judicial attempt to balance the equities in a given
case and so to grant dissolution only to worthy parties. The problem
with such a procedure, however, is that an aggrieved party will often
have great difficulty in predicting whether a court will agree with him
that his equities outweigh his opponent's. The statute thus gives a less-
than-clear indication of what the shareholder's rights under it are.
Aside from these difficulties of interpretation, the statute's gravest
shortcoming is that it does not apply to a shareholder deadlock that
results from "special provisions or arrangements designed to create veto
power among the shareholders. 2 -3 This requirement was put into the
act by amendment in 195924 and prohibits the court from dissolving any
deadlocked corporation unless the deadlock results from a fifty-fifty
voting split of the shareholders; or unless the shareholder deadlock
stemming from a high vote requirement results in the deadlock of the
board of directors, which is then unable to take any effective corporate
action.2 5 This fifty-fifty voting split requirement in cases of shareholder
deadlock is not characteristic of all states' dissolution-upon-deadlock
statutes, 26 but it is contained in a number of them .2 The rationale behind
the requirement seems to be that the charter or by-law provision or
"Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation
Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525, 547-48. However, the majority view seems to be that good faith is
immaterial if the statute authorizes a stated percentage of the corporation's shareholders to petition
for dissolution. 2 HORNSTEIN § 789.
2116A FLETCHER § 8036.
222 HORNSTEIN § 820.
22ROBNSON § 221, at 548.
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(2) (1965), quoted note 3 supra.
21Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson Treatise Reviewed and
the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768, 866 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Folk].
"'Hinson, Shareholders' Agreements: Negotiations and Drafting, in NORTH CAROLINA BAR
AsS'N, supra note i, at VII-l, -17.
"The New York statute, for example, specifically permits dissolution upon the petition of the
holders of more than one-third of the shares of the corporation if there is in effect a charter
provision requiring a greater than majority vote for director action or for election of directors.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104(b) (McKinney 1963).
2116A FLETCHER § 8016.1; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.28 (1956).
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shareholder agreement providing for a high vote requirement should
take "precedence over breaking impasse and letting the feuding share-
holders end their relationship."2 Why this should be so is difficult to
understand.
The fifty-fifty voting split requirement has been justified on the
grounds that when the shareholders inserted a high vote requirement in
the corporate charter, they could have also inserted a provision giving
any shareholder the unilateral right to dissolve the corporation, 29 pur-
suant to the authority of section 55-125(a)(3). That section provides that
the court has the discretion to dissolve a corporation upon petition of a
shareholder if all the present shareholders are parties to, or transferees
with notice of, a written agreement allowing the petitioning shareholder
to dissolve the corporation at will.30 Thus in creating veto powers the
shareholders could also create an escape from the corporation if dead-
lock results therefrom by the use of a subsection (a)(3) agreement.
Subsection (a)(3), however, does not provide an adequate safeguard
against the effects of the fifty-fifty voting split requirement. First, in
order for any shareholder to have the unilateral right to dissolve, all the
present shareholders must either be original parties to the agreement
conferring the right, or transferees with actual notice of it. If there is a
shareholder who was neither an original party to the agreement nor a
transferee with notice, the unilateral right to dissolve would be de-
stroyed, but the high vote requirement would remain. Secondly, the
agreement providing for the unilateral dissolution right must denomi-
nate the specific shareholder as having the right; so if after the deadlock
occurs, the shareholder seeking dissolution is not so denominated in the
agreement, he is deprived of the escape of dissolution because of the
21Folk 866.
29Latty, The Close Corporation, in THE MICHIE COMPANY, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
MANUAL 203 (1960).
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(3) (1965) provides:
(a) The superior court shall have power to liquidate the assets and business of a
corporation in an action by a shareholder when it is established that:
(3) All of the present shareholders are parties to, or are transferees or subscri-
bers of shares with actual notice of a written agreement, whether embodied in
the charter or separate therefrom, entitling the complaining shareholder to liqui-
dation or dissolution of the corporation at will or upon the occurrence of some
event which has subsequently occurred . . ..
By the wording of (a)(3), the agreement can also provide that the shareholder is given the unilateral
right to petition for dissolution only after the fact of deadlock has occurred.
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fifty-fifty voting split requirement unless he can persuade another share-
holder who was given the dissolution right to exercise it. Thirdly, be-
cause the existence of such a unilateral dissolution right would
undoubtedly decrease the transferability of shares (as many potential
purchasers would not be willing to entrust the future of their investment
to the whim of another shareholder) there is a definite discouraging
influence on the employment of subsection (a)(3) agreements in the first
place.
In the absence of a subsection (a)(3) agreement, the fifty-fifty vot-
ing split requirement can work to deny dissolution relief to a majority
shareholder, for example, who could have been granted dissolution had
he been merely a fifty-percent shareholder without there being a high
vote requirement. The requirement is difficult to justify as a measure
to discourage agreements providing for greater than majority voting
because the "veto" exception applies whether or not the shareholder
himself had agreed to the arrangement; the shareholder who takes his
interest with the arrangement already in force is no less bound by it than
was his transferor. Section 55-125 should be revised to eliminate this
requirement,31 especially in light of the broad authorization given by
the North Carolina Corporations Act for greater-than-majority quorum
and voting requirements 2 and the greater possibilities of deadlock they
create.33
The difficulties in applying the dissolution-upon-deadlock statute
are aggravated by a deep-seated judicial reluctance to order dissolution
in any case.34 This judicial reticence probably stems from several
sources. First, since dissolution irrevocably destroys a business that is
at least potentially viable, many courts avoid it as "court-enforced cor-
porate suicide (or judicial murder). 3 5 Sometimes courts appear con-
31This opinion has been expressed by Dean Latty: It is a serious mater to have "statutory
tolerence of unanimity requirements, high vote and quorum requirements and other partner-like
co-control features and yet, despite the deadlocks thereby arising, to provide no 'out,' by dissolu-
tion or otherwise." Because corporations statutes are generally drawn with the public corporation
in mind, this problem has been generally overlooked. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 447-48 (1956).
32rhe North Carolina statute authorizes greater-than-majority quorum and voting require-
ments for directors, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-28(d) (1965); greater-than-majority quorum for share-
holders, id. § 55-65(a) (1965); and greater-than-majority shareholder voting, id. § 55-66 (1965).
33Wolens, A Round Peg-A Square Hole: The Close Corporation and the Law, 22 Sw. L.J.
811, 819 (1968).




cerned that dissolution may "trigger adverse tax consequences or cause
a sale of corporate assets at sacrifice prices."36 Further, the courts may
feel that dissolution because of deadlock is too powerful a weapon for
any party in a position to say, "[I]f you don't do it my way, we'll throw
out the baby with the bathwater."37
These shortcomings of the North Carolina dissolution-upon-
deadlock statute can best be appreciated if one realizes the impact they
may have on a small close corporation, which might easily have an equal
division of voting power 8 and be especially susceptible to deadlock.
These corporations are often merely "incorporated partnerships," and
the successful operation of any such business is necessarily based on a
harmonious relationship among its participants. "[G]iven the frailties of
human nature, such relationships can easily be soured for a variety of
reasons, ranging from petty annoyances to incompatibility to outright
knavery."39 The inability of such a shareholder in such a business to
terminate his association with the company when the working relation-
ships sour is a problem peculiar to close corporations. In a public corpo-
ration, the stockholder can sell his shares on the open market. In a
partnership, when things come to an impasse, the partner can always
bring about dissolution. 0 At worst, the partner may be liable for dam-
ages if he improperly dissolves-but he can get out of the business., In
a close corporation, however, the shareholder must depend on the relief
afforded by the dissolution-upon-deadlock statute, which falls far short
of providing satisfactory protection. 2 When the consistent judicial re-
luctance to grant dissolution relief is combined with the inherent diffi-
culties of utilizing the dissolution statute, the great need for providing
remedies other than dissolution is plain.
3
3 Hinson, supra note 25, at VII-18.
"Fales, Judicial Attitudes Towards the Rights of Minority Stockholders, 22 Bus. LAWYER
459, 464 (1967).
'4AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED § 97, 2
(2d ed. 1971).
39Lebowitz, Corporations, 1972 Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 86, 154 (1972).
4
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31(2); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 442
(1966); Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50 Ky. L.J. 125, 171 (1961).
"Latty, supra note 31, at 447.
"Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969
U. ILL. L.F. 1, 11 (1969).
3See Folk 871.
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ALTERNATIVES TO DISSOLUTION
Receiver-Custodian. At common law if a corporation were so
paralyzed by deadlock that it was impossible to carry on the business
to the advantage of the interested parties, a court was held to have the
power to appoint a receiver to manage the affairs of the corporation
until the deadlock was broken." The American courts have generally
acknowledged this rule, but they usually require that the deadlock be
so serious that insolvency is threatened.45 Among the reasons frequently
advanced by the courts for refusing to appoint a temporary receiver are
a reluctance to intrude into the management of a corporation and the
adverse effect the appointment of a receiver may have on the corpora-
tion's credit." Also, many courts have hesitated to wrest control of all
the affairs of the corporation from the body in which such control has
been statutorily vested.
Faced with this judicial reluctance to exercise equity jurisdiction,
several states have expressly given the courts discretion to appoint a
receiver or a custodian to manage a corporation's business in the event
of deadlock. The Delaware custodian provision is probably the most
comprehensive.47 Delaware provides that upon the application of any
shareholder the court may appoint a custodian (1) if the shareholders
have been unable to elect directors or (2) if the business of the corpora-
tion is threatened with irreparable harm because the directors are so
divided that they cannot manage the affairs of the corporation and the
shareholders cannot break the deadlock.4" The custodian is given essen-
tially all the powers the board of directors had.49 Virginia"0 and Pennsyl-
vania51 also provide substantially the same relief.
1116 FLETCHER § 7713.
45Note, 45 IOWA L. REV., supra note 5, at 772-73. It has been generally held that before a
receiver may be appointed for a deadlocked corporation there must be, in addition to the deadlock,
misconduct by the directors, officers, or shareholders in control; lack of governing officers; cessa-
tion of business; continuous losses; or threatened or actual insolvency. In other words, there must
be a real danger to the property interests of the shareholders. Comment, Corporations-
Receivership and Dissolution as Remedies for Management Deadlock, 47 Mica. L. REv. 684,
689-90 (1949).
"Note, 45 IOWA L. REv., supra note 5, at 772-73.
112 O'NEAL § 9.31.
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 (Supp. 1968).
'id. tit. 8, § 226(b) (Supp. 1968). In addition, id. tit. 8, § 352 (Supp. 1968), provides similar
relief for close corporations.
OVA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
5"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1513.1 (Supp. 1972).
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There are problems inherent in these receivership statutes. First,
while appointment of a receiver does offer a less drastic alternative to
dissolution, like the equitable remedy, it involves the complete reloca-
tion of corporate control.12 Therefore, it does not afford the gentler
solutions offered by other types of deadlock remedies. Secondly, the
receiver himself is placed in a precarious position, since both factions
within the corporation may be anxious to sue the receiver for misman-
agement or for improper motivation if the business suffers reverses
under his direction.
5 3
The use of a receiver for deadlocked corporations does, however,
afford certain advantages. It allows a court to give adequate protection
to both the shareholders and creditors of the corporation, 4 and it pro-
vides in at least the first instance an opportunity to break the deadlock
without the drastic remedy of dissolution 5 by giving the parties "a
sufficient cooling off period to allow the restoration of an amiable rela-
tionship.""6 However, if the causes of the deadlock are sufficiently bit-
ter, the shareholders will simply continue their disagreements once the
receiver is removed.5 7 In such circumstances, the appointment of a re-
ceiver would have accomplished little more than that which would have
been possible if other, less drastic remedies-for example, the appoint-
ment of a provisional director 5 -had been available. As with dissolu-
tion, the severe nature of receivership in relation to what it can accom-
plish for a deadlocked corporation perhaps explains the courts' reluct-
ance to exercise their discretion to use it." Therefore, in light of the
advantages and disadvantages of the receivership statutes, they are
probably not an adequate alternative to the dissolution-upon-deadlock
statute.
52In re Jamison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 27, - 322 P.2d 246, 250 (1958).
0Fales, supra note 37, at 463.
12 O'NEAL § 9.31, note 9.
551d. § 9.31.
"Note, 45 IOWA L. REV., supra note 5, at 773.
571d.
"See text accompanying notes 89-105 infra.
"In Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Inc., 37 Del. Ch. 348, 143 A.2d 272 (Ch. 1958),
construing the precusor to the present Delaware receivership statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226
(Supp. 1968), the court was presented with a typical deadlock situation: two twenty-five percent
shareholders could not agree with the fifty percent shareholder, and as a result the shareholders
had failed for four annual meetings to elect directors. Nevertheless, the court, stating that the
statute did not require it to appoint a receiver, refused to do so, saying that the possibility of
deadlock was "necessarily implicit in the arithmetic of stock holdings." 37 Del. Ch. at 351, 143
A.2d at 274.
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Arbitration. Another possible remedy that could serve as an al-
ternative to dissolution for a deadlocked corporation is mandatory arbi-
tration. This type of relief has not been enacted by any state as yet, but
it would seem to offer for many deadlocked corporations advantages far
superior to either dissolution or receivership.
One possible statutory scheme would make arbitration available in
the eventuality of deadlock unless the parties have expressly agreed not
to permit it. A stated percentage of the shareholders on either side of
the disagreement could petition for an order compelling the other side
to arbitrate, and the parties would be bound by the arbitrator's decision
unless both sides agreed not to abide by it."§
The advantages of such a provision are several. First, the triangular
dialogue between the parties may increase the chances of compromise
by creating an atmosphere conducive to settlement. The arbitration
proceedings would afford privacy, which would appeal to shareholders
who do not want internal squabbles brought out in open court. Arbitra-
tion is also faster and less expensive than litigation, and "[s]peed is
particularly desirable where personal animosities threaten irreparable
harm to the business."61 Most importantly, arbitration would allow
using as the arbitrator an expert in the particular matters over which
the parties are deadlocked, thereby maximizing the chances of arriving
at the best possible business decision and increasing the likelihood of
subsequent cooperation among the estranged shareholders. And since
the arbitrator would be deciding what action the corporation should
take only in relation to the specific disagreement causing the deadlock,
arbitration, unlike receivership, does not involve the complete confisca-
tion of corporate control.
Since no state has enacted a mandatory arbitration statute, it is
difficult to predict how such a provision would be received by the courts.
It is possible that many courts would use other powers to circumvent
the effect of the statute in light of the traditional judicial opposition to
arbitration.62 However, arbitration as a deadlock-breaking device ap-
pears to be generally attractive to the North Carolina corporate bar. A
survey conducted in 1969 by Professor Donald Clifford under a grant
from the North Carolina Law Center indicated that a majority of the
"Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L.
REv. 271, 283 (1970).
"Id. at 285.
"See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra.
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state's corporate lawyers favored the adoption of a provision making
shareholder agreements to arbitrate enforceable and that if such a stat-
ute were in effect, over seventy percent of the lawyers responding would
use it.63
Nevertheless, while a mandatory arbitration statute would have the
virtue of affording relief tending to heal rather than to destroy the
corporate entity," it would divest the corporate participants of control
over the resolution of the immediate question given to the arbitrator.
In that respect, arbitration is relief in the nature of, but less drastic than,
receivership. And like receivership, arbitration accomplishes nothing
that could not be also accomplished by the less severe remedy of the
appointment of a provisional director.15
"Section 210 Relief." The most sweeping alternative to dissolu-
tion is so-called "section 210 relief," patterned after section 210 of the
English Companies Act." That section provides that if a court is pre-
sented with a petition that would justify dissolution of a corporation,
the court may, instead of dissolving, "make such order as it thinks fit"
to bring to an end the matters complained of.
South Carolina is the only state to have enacted a statute similar
to section 210.67 Under the South Carolina provision, if a shareholder
files a petition for dissolution under the state's dissolution statute,68 the
"North Carolina Law Center, Survey of North Carolina Corporate Bar, summer 1969 (un-
published data in office of Professor Donald Clifford, Chapel Hill, N.C.). The questions asked
were: "The 1969 legislature considered but did not pass an arbitration act which would have made
enforceable agreements to arbitrate future disputes. (a) If such an act were in force in North
Carolina, would you be likely to recommend use of arbitration agreements as a means of resolving
shareholder conflicts or deadlocks?" Of those responding, 73.4% s aid yes, and 25.5% said no. "(b)
Please indicate whether or not you would favor the adoption of such an arbitration act." Of those
responding, 21.7% strongly favored it, 49.7% favored it with reservations, 7.9% were neutral or
had no opinion, 8.5% disfavored it with reservations, and 12.2% strongly disfavored it. On the
question of the present enforceability of shareholder agreements to arbitrate future disputes, see
text accompanying notes 108-09 infra.
"For a discussion of the psychological effects of arbitration as used for a deadlock breaking
device see Note, Some Experimental Parallels to the Deadlocked Close Corporation, 13 U. FLA.
L. REv. 232 (1960).
15See text accompanying notes 89-105 infra.
"Companies Act, I I & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210 (1948).
67S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23 (Supp. 1971).
Oid. § 12-22.15 (Supp. 197 1). Among the grounds justifying dissolution are that the directors
are so divided that effective action is impossible and the shareholders are unable to end the division,
id. § 12-22.15(a)(1) (Supp. 1971), that the shareholders are so divided that directors cannot be
elected, id. § 12-22.15(a)(2) (Supp. 1971), and that the shareholders are so divided that the busi-
ness cannot be conducted to the general advantage of the shareholders, id. § 12-22.15(a)(3) (Supp.
1971).
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court may resort to the remedies stipulated in the section 210 statute
instead of ordering dissolution. The court's power to issue such relief is
discretionary, and it may be exercised as an alternative to dissolution
even if the statutory requirements for dissolution are met, whether or
not the circumstances are such that dissolution would not be "appropri-
ate." 9 The powers the court may thus exercise include altering or can-
celling any provision of the corporation's charter, by-laws," or resolu-
tions;71 compelling a buy-out of share interests; 2 or "directing or prohib-
iting any act of the corporation or of shareholders, directors, officers
or other persons party to the action.1
73
The South Carolina statute thus affords the fullest array of reme-
dies that can be fashioned to meet the individual circumstances of any
deadlock situation. More than any other alternative deadlock remedy,
it replaces the present statute's dissolve-or-nothing alternatives with a
true choice. In addition, the experience that British companies have had
with the section tends to suggest that the mere presence of the relief
serves as a strong inducement to shareholders and directors to work out
their disagreements among themselves and so to avoid deadlock in the
first place.
74
Nevertheless, there are serious deficiencies in a statute modeled on
section 210 because it furnishes virtually no guidelines as to the specific
measures a court should take to break deadlock. The corporate partici-
pants, as well as any other interested parties, are thrown completely
upon the mercy and judgment of the court. The traditional reluctance
of courts to deal with questions of business judgment75 and the fact that
most judges are not professionally equipped to do so could well lead the
courts either to ignore the statute and order dissolution on the one hand,
or to issue ill-founded directives on the other. Additionally, many share-
holders undoubtedly regard a court "as a less than ideal forum for
resolving their internal squabbles," and therefore may not seek relief
under section 210 statute except in the most extreme circumstances in
"Id. § 12-22.23(b) (Supp. 1971).
7"Id. § 12-22.23(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
7 1d. § 12.22.23(a)(2) (Supp. 1971).
7 Id. § 12-22.23(a)(4) (Supp. 1971).
rId. § 12-22.23(a)(3) (Supp. 1971).
74Folk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. Rav. 275, 335
(1963).
"Note, 56 VA. L. REv., supra note 60, at 278.
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order to avoid having to tell all in open court to a possibly unsympath-
etic judge."
Even so, the Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee of the
General Statutes Commission recommended that the 1971 North Caro-
lina General Assembly enact a section 210 statute identical to that of
South Carolina, and the same recommendation will be made again in
1973.11 Despite the fact that survey results indicate that adoption of such
a measure is generally favored by the North Carolina corporate bar,
78
there are deficiencies inherent in this type of deadlock relief such that
the Committee's recommendations in this regard should be pretermitted
in favor of other, more clearly specified remedies.
Compulsory Buy-out of Shares. Another alternative to dissolu-
tion upon deadlock is a compulsory buy-out of shares. This remedy can
be fashioned to function in two different ways. First, it could provide
781d. The note writer suggested that the fact that the South Carolina statute has failed to
produce a single reported case may demonstrate that shareholders are reluctant to petition for relief
under the provisions. Id. One of the ways in which section 210 deadlock relief differs from the other
alternatives is that it is the only remedy which requires the judge to learn all of the business aspects
of the corporation concerned in order to formulate the decree he will issue to break the deadlock.
77H. 366, § 34, 1973 N.C. General Assembly, reprinted, Clifford (Appendix). The proposal
is to add a new section 55-125.1 to the General Statutes to read: Discretion of court to grant relief
other than dissolution.
(a) In any action filed by a shareholder to dissolve the corporation under G.S. 55-
125(a), the court may make such order or grant such relief, other than dissolution, as
in it's discretion it deems appropriate, including, without limitation, an order
(1) canceling or altering any provision contained in the charter or by the bylaws
of the corporation; or
(2) canceling, altering, or enjoining any resolution or other act of the corpora-
tion; or
(3) directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of shareholders, direc-
tors, officers or other persons party to the action; or
(4) providing for the purchase of their fair value of shares of any shareholder,
either by the corporation or by other shareholders.
(b) Such relief may be granted as an alternative to a decree of dissolution, or may be
granted whenever the circumstances of the case are such that relief, but not dissolution,
would be appropriate.
7 Clifford 1-27. The respondents were asked if they favored or disfavored adding discretionary
relief to the North Carolina Business Corporations Act. The question read: "Under this kind of
provision, the court may give a broad range of relief either as an alternative to a decree of
dissolution or whenever the circumstances of the case are such that relief, but not dissolution, would
be appropriate. Such relief may include, at the discretion of the court, a forced share purchase, a
change in the bylaws or articles of incorporation, or some other relief tailored to the facts of the
case." Of those responding, 18.9% strongly favored it, 44.3% favored it with reservations, 18.4%
were neutral or had no opinion, 14.1% disfavored it with reservations, and 4.3% strongly disfavored
it.
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that once a shareholder has sued for dissolution because of a deadlock,
any other shareholder may petition the court to appraise the value of
the petitioner's shares. After the appraisal the other shareholder may
elect to buy the petitioner's shares at the appraised value.79
The second way in which the remedy could function is as follows:
when a petition for dissolution has been filed by a shareholder, but the
court finds in its discretion that relief, but not dissolution, is called for,
the court could compel the purchase at fair value of the shares of any
shareholder, either by the corporation or by other shareholders. This is
the form of buy-out remedy contained in the South Carolina section 210
statute 80 and is the form that will be recommended for adoption by the
1973 North Carolina General Assembly.
81
There is a distinct difference between the two forms of the remedy.
In the first, the party to the deadlock desirous of continuing the business
is merely given the option by the 'statute of purchasing the other party's
interest in the corporation. If he does not exercise this option, his posi-
tion in relation to the dissolution petition is no worse than it was before
the option was given. The party being bought out is not prejudiced
because he has sued for a liquidation of the corporation, and the ap-
praised value of his shares will presumably be no less than their value
in dissolution. The central purpose of such a provision is to prevent a
dissident shareholder from using the threat of dissolution to "bludgeon
the defendant into a buy-out at an inflated price.
' 82
The buy-out remedy as implemented by South Carolina's section
210 statute empowers the court to order either the corporation or any
shareholder to buy out the shares of any other shareholder. As with the
first form of buy-out remedy, forcing a shareholder who sues for disso-
lution to sell his interest cannot prejudice him because he gets essentially
what he sued for. However, the party compelled to buy the shares may
very well be in no economic position to do so, whether he is the plaintiff
in the dissolution proceedings, a defendant shareholder, or the corpora-
tion itself. Much financial hardship can be avoided by permitting the
court to fix an installment payment schedule in addition to the price to
be paid.83 Nevertheless, under this form of buy-out a possibility of
2 9This is essentially the Connecticut buy-out statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384 (Supp.
1973).
"°S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23(a)(4) (Supp. 1971).
B'See note 77 supra.




extortion could remain if a shareholder, especially a minority share-
holder, intentionally creates a deadlock situation in the hope that a
court will direct a sale of his shares to other corporate factions. By the
same token, a majority shareholder is in an especially good position to
arrange for deadlock as a means of forcing another shareholder out of
the corporation. The availability of a judicial buy-out order could invite
abuse of majority status in a case in which the majority foresees a very
profitable future for the corporation and a likelihood that the appraised
value of the corporation's shares will be less than the discounted value
of their potential future earning capacity.
It is true, however, that under the section 210 form of buy-out
remedy, as under the first form, the court does have discretion in decid-
ing whether or not to issue a buy-out order; and the potential for extor-
tion due to the compulsory nature of the section 210 version is not as
great as it would be in the absence of this discretion. Because the court
would have the option of turning to the other forms of relief that are
authorized by the section 210 statute, as a practical matter it would
seem unlikely that a shareholder could be able to use the court as a lever
to force an unwanted purchase or sale of shares on the other side if
hardship would result.
Both forms of court-ordered buy-out possess the singular virtue of
breaking the corporate deadlock once and for all while preserving the
enterprise as a going business and offering reasonable assurances that
a dissatisfied shareholder will realize a fair price for his holdings. 4 Both
forms could also serve as a strong inducement to corporate participants
to avoid deadlock situations so as not to be forced to purchase a large
stock interest in order to preserve the business. And of course, the
availability of an alternative to dissolution should discourage the courts'
tendency to do nothing when they are faced with the choice of ordering
dissolution or doing nothing.8 5 In view of these advantages, it is to be
hoped that the 1973 General Assembly will adopt some form of buy-
out provision. The first form, giving the court the power to grant an
option to purchase, involves little danger of abuse. The second form, if
coupled with the safeguards of empowering the court to set the prices
for the shares, to fix an installment payment schedule,8 and to consider
'"O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 341,
358 (1958).
nSee text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
"Bradley, supra note 19, at 546.
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a shareholder's good faith, 7 could go even further in providing a much-
needed and far-reaching alternative88 to dissolution upon deadlock.
The Provisional Director. Another alternative to dissolution in
the case of deadlock is the appointment of a provisional director. Cali-
fornia's statute89 is the prototype of this form of relief. If a corporation
has "an even number of directors who are equally divided and cannot
agree as to the management of its affairs, so that its business cannot
longer be conducted to advantage or so that there is danger that its
property and business will be impaired and lost," one-half of the direc-
tors or one-third of the shareholders may petition for an impartial
person to serve as a director until he is removed by the court or ousted
by a majority of the shareholders. The provisional director is vested with
all the powers of any other director, including the rights of notice and
voting."
Using a provisional director as a deadlock-breaking device offers
many advantages not afforded by other remedies. First, unlike dissolu-
tion or compulsory buy-out, it does not require permanent alteration of
the corporation's structure of ownership.9 When the cause of the dead-
lock is removed, the director is removed, either by court order or vote
of the corporate participants, and the former composition of the board
is restored. Secondly, unlike receivership, the provisional director rem-
edy does not require that control over corporate action be entirely
wrested from the participants. Under receivership 2 the custodian or
receiver is solely responsible for making all decisions that the directors
were formerly collectively responsible for making. The provisional
director remedy, on the other hand, involves simply adding one more
person to the decision-making group. 3 It is true, of course, that the
provisional director is intended to hold the balance of power with regard
to those questions causing the deadlock. But the advantage of the rem-
edy is that with respect to other questions, where the original directors
"See generally Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U. CH. L. REv. 778, 791 (1952).
"'Folk 867.
"CAL. CORP. CODE § 819 (West 1955).
'Id. § 819(b) (West 1955). Missouri has a provisional director provision which is a copy of
the California provision. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323 (1966).
t2 O'NEAL § 9.30.
"See text accompanying notes 44-59 supra.
"Thus, for example, with a four-man board of directors receivership requires deleting their




are in agreement, the authority to make decisions will remain in them.
Additionally, the provisional director remedy contemplates a disin-
terested outsider94 who will act in the best interests of the corporation
until he is removed.95 It thereby affords an opportunity to bring into the
decision-making process a participant who may have some expertise in
the area of conflict causing the deadlock. Thus, unlike the arbitrator,
who is limited to addressing himself only to the issue presented to him,
the provisional director may be able to command a certain trust and
respect from the other directors in promulgating new ideas or alterna-
tives to improve the general health of the enterprise.96 The provisional
director differs from an arbitrator in one other important respect: be-
cause he can operate in a setting and atmosphere familiar to the other
directors the provisional director is in a unique position to effect a
comprehensive settlement among the factions.97
The leading case" interpreting the California provisional director
statute, In re Jamison Steel Corp.,99 illustrates the flexibility afforded
by this remedy. There the allegation was that the board of directors was
so evenly divided that disagreement was paralyzing the corporation's
ability to make a profit. The corporation's four-man board of directors
was evenly divided on questions of declaring dividends, having the com-
pany's books independently audited, and increasing the number of direc-
tors. In addition, the board had been unable to elect new officers. The
court said that the provisional director remedy was designed to be used
before the stage at which the need for the more drastic remedies of
receivership or dissolution is reached, and therefore the mere perpetua-
tion of existing policies or incumbent officers is a failure of corporate
management sufficient to support the appointment of a provisional
director.100
There are, however, certain problems inherent in the provisional
director remedy.10 ' First, if the root cause of the deadlock is the basic
9 CAL. CORP. CODE § 819(b) (West 1955). All of the provisional director statutes specify
criteria for ensuring that the person appointed is bona fide impartial. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-703(c) (1970).
"5Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 953 (1966).
"I1d.
7 Folk 867.
12 O'NEAL § 9.30.
"158 Cal. App. 2d 27, 322 P.2d 246 (1958).
"Id. at _, 322 P.2d at 251.
'0 There is also a problem of interpretation involved in a provisional director statute such as
California's. That is whether the statute gives the provisional director all the powers conferred on
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incompatibility of the principals, the appointment of a provisional direc-
tor "may only postpone the day when more drastic remedies must be
invoked."1 2 However, since the appointment of a provisional director
is intended to be a gentle form of relief and since it may lead to a
reconciliation of the principals, its use should not be discounted merely
because it will not always be the final remedy that must be employed
by the court in a given situation. Moreover, any form of relief that does
not alter the corporation's structure may be only postponing more dras-
tic measures.
The Business Corporations Act Drafting Committee of the General
Statutes Commission will submit a provisional director statute for
adoption by the 1973 North Carolina General Assembly." 3 It is pat-
a director by statute since he is a statutory appointee or whether his powers are circumscribed along
with those of the other directors by the articles and bylaws of the corporation. Comment, Unusual
Statutory Remedies for the Deadlocked Corporation in California: Voluntary Dissolution and the
Provisional Director, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 272, 279-80 n.33 (1960). It would seem that insofar as
the remedy is designed to be a gentle one, the latter interpretation is to be favored.
102Folk, supra note 95, at 953.
'H. 366, § 10, 1973 N.C. General Assembly, reprinted, Clifford (Appendix). The proposal
is to add a new section 55-39.2 to the General Statutes to read: Appointment of provisional
director.
(a) If the directors of a corporation are deadlocked in the management of the corporate
affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and if injury to the
corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof, the superior court of
the county where the registered office of the corporation is located may, notwithstanding
any provisions of the charter or bylaws of the corporation and whether or not an action
is pending for an involuntary dissolution of the corporation, appoint a provisional dircec-
tor pursuant to this section.
(b) Action for such appointment may be filed by not less than one-half of the directors
or by the holders of not less than one-third of the total outstanding shares of the
corporation regardless of voting rights. Notice of such action shall be served upon the
directors (other than those who have filed the action) and upon the corporation in the
manner provided by law for service of a summons and complaint, and a hearing shall
be held not less than ten days after such service is effected. At such hearing all interested
persons shall be given an opportunity to be heard.
(c) The provisional director shall be an impartial person, who is neither a shareholder
nor a creditor of the corporation, nor related by blood or marriage to any of the other
directors of the corporation, or to any judge of the court by which he is appointed. The
provisional director shall have all the rights and powers of a director, and shall be
entitled to notice of the meetings of the board of directors and to vote at such meetings,
until he is removed by order of the court or by vote or written consent of the holders of
a majority of the voting shares or holders of such higher number of voting shares as
may be required under the charter or the bylaws for the election of directors. He shall
be entitled to receive such compensation as may be agreed upon between him and the
corporation, and in the absence of such agreement he shall be entitled to such compensa.
tion as shall be fixed by the court.
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terned after the Georgia provisional director statute,0 4 and follows that
statute in eliminating the need for an arithmetically divided board of
directors before the remedy can be utilized.' Because the remedy offers
many unique advantages and poses few serious dangers, the General
Assembly should adopt it.
CONCLUSION
The shareholder in a close corporation that is suffering from a
deadlock is peculiarly at the mercy of the state corporation statute's
deadlock provisions. If he is fortunate, there may be private provisions
drawn in the past that will resolve a deadlock situation. For example, a
shareholder agreement or a charter provision might provide that impar-
tial outsiders would be brought in to manage the business in the event
of deadlock, or that a voting trust might be used for temporary manage-
ment.' 6 However, the attractiveness of contractual arrangements as an
alternative to the statutory remedy is minimized for at least two reasons.
First, these devices are available "only where the incorporators had
sufficient acumen and foresight to recognize the possibility of eventual
conflict." 107 Secondly, there is a "substantial question as to the enforcea-
bility of an arbitration agreement in North Carolina."'0 8 At common
law, arbitration agreements dealing with future corporate disputes were
not enforceable, partly because of the attitude of the courts that share-
holder compacts may not subvert the policies of majority rule and busi-
Survey results indicate that the North Carolina corporate bar generally favored adoption of
a provisional director remedy. The question asked was: "Under this type of remedy, if an evenly
divided board of directors is deadlocked, half of the directors or a third of the shareholders may
seek a court order designating an 'impartial person' to serve as director so long as the court keeps
him in office or until he is removed by a majority of the shareholders. The provisional director is
given the power of an ordinary director, including the right to notice, to attend meetings, and to
vote. This remedy has been characterized as 'essentially a method to force arbitration on warring
factions.'" Of those responding, 9.6% strongly favored it, 39.6% favored it with reservations, 21.4%
were neutral or had no opinion, 19.3% disfavored it with reservations, and 10.2% strongly disfa-
vored it. Clifford 1-27.
'04GA. CODE ANN. § 22-703 (1970).
105See text accompanying notes 23-33 supra on the need to eliminate the requirement for a
fifty-fifty voting split for deadlock relief to be applied.
IG'Also, the shareholder-incorporators could have entered a section 55-125(a)(3) agreement by
which a specified shareholder was given the power to petition for dissolution at will, or by which
the occurrence of deadlock conferred such power on the shareholder. See text accompanying notes
29-31 supra.
'Note, 56 VA. L. REv., supra note 60, at 272.
'IsHinson, supra note 25, at VII-16.
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